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CANADIAN SPEAKER
Dr. Garry McKeevert
Thank you very much, Jim. I have been chosen to kick off this discussion.
Let me begin by saying that I am honored to speak to such a distinguished
gathering from the legal profession. I don't often get to speak to an audience
of high-powered lawyers such as is here today. I also want to thank Professor
King for doing me the honor of inviting me to speak here.
As Jim said in his introduction, I am a civil servant. My minister, Dwight
Duncan, is from Windsor,1 so he is close to the U.S. Many of the people here
from Toronto will meet Mr. Duncan, or have met him, or do meet him in the
course of their business, day-to-day, week-to-week, and I just want them and
the rest of you to know that as a civil servant, it is important for me to under-
line that if in the course of my presentation you detect any political leanings
or political bias, that these are entirely a figment of your imagination. As a
civil servant, I have no political feelings or leanings whatsoever. I merely
make - make objective judgments and give objective advice. David will -
MR. MANNING: He does speak Irish.
(Laughter.)
DR. McKEEVER: David will appreciate that.
"The Blackout of 2003" is in the title of the speech, and I will certainly
talk about it, but I am not going to get into details of transmission regulation
and the various ongoing work that is in progress at the moment in cross-
border, or committees, or groups, to improve the reliability of the transmis-
sion system.
That is a crucial issue. We are guilty of a little smugness about it in On-
tario. We have very little reason to be smug in Ontario about energy matters,
t Dr. Garry McKeever is a Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of Energy Supply and
Conservation at the Ontario Ministry of Energy, based in Toronto. Since joining the Ministry
in 2000, his work has focused mainly on policy issues related to electricity supply and pricing.
Early in his career, he worked as an industrial economist for the Governments of Manitoba
and Ontario. He then joined CIBC where he was Assistant General Manager, Economics
Division and head of the Industrial Economics group. He subsequently worked in the Intema-
tional Division and the Wealth Management area. He then spent two years in the Retail
Investments Group of Canada Trust as a Director of Analysis. Dr. McKeever holds an M.A.
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Dwight Duncan, Member of Provincial Parliament, http://dwightduncan.on.ca (last
visited Nov. 1, 2005).
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but on the day of the blackout, I was sitting in my office, and the political
environment and energy environment at the time were that the government
was in deep trouble politically, largely as a result of energy problems, and
when the lights went out, everybody on the floor said, "Uh-oh." Our auto-
matic assumption was that it was Ontario's fault; that one of our nuclear sta-
tions had gone down, or we had yet another problem, one of many problems
that we had been having.
And it was with great relief, and again a return of a little Canadian smug-
ness, that we were finally able to point to Ohio and say it was really Ohio's
fault, and I think that's continuing the thread of yesterday's discussion where
you guys had gotten beat up on the softwood lumber issue. But I'm not going
to belabor that point today. I don't want you to feel that Canadians whine all
the time. I am going to bare our souls and tell you about the challenges that
we face in Ontario on the generation side - because the threats to Ontario's
reliability come from the generation side of the business, not, in our view,
from the transmission side.
Our transmission network is owned by Hydro One, which is 100% owned
by the province, and it is regulated, highly regulated. We have obligatory -
we have reliability standards, which Hydro One has to observe. 2 We are rea-
sonably comfortable with the transmission network, but we spend a lot of
time and generate a lot of stomach acid on the topic of generation.
Just to cover quickly what is happening on the blackout, Ontario is par-
ticipating in a bilateral Canada-U.S. group, which is working on the forma-
tion of an all-electricity-reliability organization, which would basically stan-
dardize reliability standards across -within the United States, where there is
no universal standard at this point in time with the different structure of the
U.S. electricity industry.3 There are a number of workshops. A workshop
took place in December on this reliability organization, and a second one is
planned for this month in Washington.4 There is ongoing activity in that. In
Canada, there is a federal-provincial-territorial working group addressing
reliability issues, which is being chaired by the Ontario and federal govern-
ments. 5 So the point I want to make to you there is the transmission issues
2 Hydro One, Hydro One Responds to Blackout Report (Nov. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.hydroone.com/en/mediacentre/newsrelease/archives/2003/200311l19.asp.
Terms of Reference for Bilateral Electric Reliability Oversight Group,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/06-30-05-agreement.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2005).
4 Natural Resources Canada, Electricity Resources Branch, Notice of Workshop: Draft
Principles for an Electric Reliability Organization that can Function on an International
Basis, http://www2.nrcan.gc.ca/es/erb/erb/english/View.asp?x=654&oid=1045 (last updated
May 27, 2005).
Interstate Renewable Energy Council, US., Canada Collaborate to Improve Grid Reli-
ability (Jul. 2005), available at
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are not being ignored in Canada and Ontario; it is simply that our generation
challenges in Ontario are much more significant, and they are much more
interesting, I think, for a group of this nature.
So the word "reliability" in an electricity system doesn't just mean - as I
stress - a good transmission system. A reliable and well-maintained trans-
mission system is crucial, but you also have to have the stuff being produced
in a reliable fashion, a timely fashion, and in a balanced fashion. An electric-
ity system must always remain balanced. Supply and demand must always be
equal. Otherwise, the thing breaks down.
Our Minister likes to say that his three top issues as Minister of Energy
are supply, supply, and supply. And from a United States' point of view, and
from the point of view, in particular, of neighboring jurisdictions with which
we are linked through cross-border or inter-ties, we were all reminded by the
blackout of the nature and the closeness of the linkages. It is important from
a U.S. point of view that Ontario maintain its system well, and that there will
always be adequate generation, reserves of generation, and reliable genera-
tion, available in Ontario, because when we break down, it causes problems
for you.
It is important before we - before I - talk about the current generation
challenge in Ontario, to cover a little bit of the history. The Ontario system
was hydroelectric initially. It has a foundation in the early part of the twenti-
eth century until the 1950s. Older Ontarians still refer to it as "The Hydro."
6
Based on the letters we get in the Ministry, there is a significant percentage
of the population that is unaware that some of their electricity does not, in
fact, come from hydraulic sources. Hydroelectricity now only supplies about
25% of our power.7
In the 1950s and 1960s, by that time, we had run out of hydro sites. All
the large hydro sites in Ontario that were economically attractive to exploit,
had already been exploited.8 Our two biggest are on the Niagara and St. Law-
rence Rivers.9 There are quite a few smaller ones, but at that point, it was
judged that coal-fired generation offered a more economically attractive way
http;Hirecusa.org/articles/static/l/1120840711 987096476.html.
6 See Natural Resources Canada, Brief History of Hydroelectric Energy in Canada,
http://www.canren.gc.ca/tech-appl/index.asp?CaID=4&PgID=31 (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
7 Colin L. Clark, Ontario: Preparing for a Competitive Market, HYDRO REVIEW 14, 14
(Dec. 1999).
' MSN Encarta, Ontario (Province, Canada), available at
http://encarta.msn.com/text_7615779891/Ontario_(provinceCanada).html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
9 See Ontario Power Generation Inc., Annual Information Form, 1, 14 (2003),
www.opg.com/ir/reports/AIF_2003.pdf
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of expanding the system. The Ontario economy was growing very rapidly in
the 1950s and 1960s.10
Then by the 1970s, nuclear technology had become available, and Ontario
made the decision to go nuclear. And during the '70s, '80s, and early '90s,
our current nuclear fleet came on stream, and that nuclear fleet now supplies
over 40% of our power, and it is the adventures and misadventures of that
nuclear fleet that lie at the core of many of our current challenges."
The last nuclear station in Ontario was completed in 1992, and, at that
point, we had a significant surplus of capacity.' 2 Our reserves - reserve over
peak demand in an electricity system, as many of you know I'm sure, you
monitor peak demand, and you build in a reserve over that demand so that
you are capable of meeting demand in the event that some of your stations
are taken offline for maintenance or break down. Nuclear generators, being
the creation of human beings, are themselves imperfect, just like the crea-
tures that build them, and they do from time-to-time break down and also
require regular maintenance. So you keep a reserve. The rule of thumb in an
all-electricity system is that you have a reserve of about 18%. 13 It varies
slightly depending on what kind of generation capacity you have, but the rule
of thumb is something less than 20%. By the time our last nuclear station
came on stream in 1992, we had a reserve of 36%, 11,000 megawatts.
As a result, a psychology developed in Ontario that we didn't have to
worry about generation. And those of you who were in Ontario and involved
in the energy business in the 1980s, will remember that the CANDU (Canada
Deuterium Uranium Reactor) technology was touted as a great Canadian
success story. It was leading the world. Our nuclear generating stations had
operating rates that were among the highest, and so on and so forth, and eve-
rybody was very proud of this Canadian creation. However, as the stations
grew older - the first ones, as I said, were finished around 1970. The Picker-
ing "A" station was finished in 1971.14 It was 1960s technology. As it
reached ten years, eleven years, and twelve years of age, it started showing
'0 MSN Encarta, Ontario (Province, Canada), available at
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia761577989_ 11/Ontario_(provinceCanada).html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2005).
1 See Report of the Pickering "A" Review Panel, Dec. 4, 2003,
http://www.cna.ca/english/Studies/PickeringReview -%2004/pickering-report-dec2003-en.p
df (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Report of the Pickering "A" Review Panel].
12 Karen Howlett, Ontario to Dust Off 2 Reactors, NDP Says, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct.
15, 2005,
http://www.workopolis.com/servlet/Content/fasttrack/20051014/NUCLEAR14?section=Energ
y.
13 THE NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR POWER ALERT: NEW YORK'S ENERGY
CROSSROADS, 7, (Mar. 2001).
14 CANDU Owners Group Inc., CANDU Reactors,
http://www.candu.org/candureactors.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
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signs of wear and tear. And in the '90s, through the '90s, the performance of
our nuclear stations began to slow, to deteriorate somewhat. 15
As a result of the deterioration in the performance of its reactors, Ontario
Hydro in January 1997, commissioned an Integrated Independent Perform-
ance Assessment of its nuclear plants. To make a long story short, that study
said that the management of these stations had been poor, and that they had
been not properly maintained, and as a result, seven units were taken out of
service. It was expected at the time that they would begin returning by about
2000, that they would return at six-month intervals. 16 Unfortunately, the first
one didn't return until 2003.'7 So that short, compressed story is the begin-
ning of our generation crisis, generation difficulties that reached a peak in
2002.
But before then, there was a change in government in Ontario. In 1995,
we elected a conservative government.' 8 The conservatives had been out of
power for ten years, 19 and this conservative government was, by Canadian
standards, quite right wing. They were neoconservatives, spiritual soul mates
of Ronald Regan and the neoconservative movement in the United States,
admirers of Margaret Thatcher, and so on.20 They came to office with a very
clear agenda and a very clear idea of what they wanted. And they decided
after a brief period that Ontario Hydro, the provincial utility, was not work-
ing. They commissioned a number of studies, most notably one chaired by
Donald MacDonald, a very prominent Toronto lawyer, a former Federal Fi-
nance Minister.21 And they produced a white paper, which led to the Electric-
ity Act of 1998, which set out the framework within which they were going
to open the electricity market to competition. 22 There were a number of de-
lays in opening the market because local utilities, local companies had trou-
ble getting their billing systems ready and so forth. But the market eventually
opened in 2002, and, on May 1, 2002, we opened both the retail and whole-
15 Thomas Adams, Hardening of Nuclear Arteries, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 13, 1990.
6 Report of the Pickering "A" Review Panel, supra note 11.
'7 Id. at 7.
18 See Elections Ontario, 36th General Election - Summary of Valid Ballots Cast, avail-
able at
http://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results/1995results/sumvb/default.jsp?flag=E&layout-G
(last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
19 Id.
20 See Wikipedia, Politics of Ontario, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of Ontario (last visited Nov. 9, 2005) (review of recent
Ontario political developments).
21 Queen's Printer for Ontario, A Framework for Competition: The Report of the Advisory
Committee on Competition in Ontario's Electricity System to the Ontario Minister of Envi-
ronment and Energy, (MacDonald Commission Report), May 1996.22 Electricity Act, 1998, S.O., Part III (1998).
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sale markets simultaneously. 23 Residential customers were exposed fully to
the vagaries of the wholesale market price. For the first two months, it looked
great. The prices were actually lower on the wholesale market than they had
24been prior to the market opening.
But then, if you remember the year 2002, it was an exceptionally hot
summer. July and August were extremely hot, and the hot weather extended
into September. We had ten days in September in Toronto where the tem-
perature was over thirty degrees Celsius. Normally, we don't have any days
like that in September, and when people in Ontario received their electricity
- there was a one-month, two-month lag - when the bills started to land on
the doorstep in August and September, there was a violent political reaction.
It just so happened that the previous April - in April 2002, right just be-
fore the market opened, there had been a change in leadership of the conser-
vative party. Premier Harris, who was the spiritual leader of the neoconserva-
tive movement and very much a symbol of the party's robust policies, re-
signed, and Premier Eves took over.25 If you say that in politics, timing is
everything, Premier Eves' sense of timing was about as bad as it could be
because in that summer, he ran into the electricity crisis provoked by the
exceptionally hot weather, and then the following year he had to contend
with the blackout, mad cow disease, and SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome). 26 So it was a tough time - first year of Premier Eves - first year
and a half of Premier Eves' brief tenure was extremely difficult. But his in-
troduction to electricity was particularly painful.
As I say, the political reaction was violent, and the government caucus got
the message loud and clear from their voters that the kind of price increases
they were seeing - and I should say the average price of our electricity per
kilowatt hour was actually below four cents in the first two months of the
open market, but then rose to over six cents per kilowatt hour in July and
August and to over eight cents in September was up close to seven cents.27
Because of the hot weather, people were not only seeing a price increase,
they were seeing big volume increases in their consumption as their air con-
23 Electricity Act, 1998, S.O. (1998).
24 See Independent Electricity Systems Operator, available at
www.ieso.ca/imoweb/marketdata/marketSummary.asp
25 Wikipedia, Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, available at
http://www.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Ontario Progressive Conservative Party#Emie-Eves:-Distancing-thepartyfromt
he .22Common SenseRevolution.22 (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
7- See Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product by Industry, available at
http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/1 3-010-XIE/2003004/gdp2003004.htm (last visited
Nov. 9, 2005).
27 See Independent Electricity Systems Operator website, available at
www.ieso.com/imoweb/marketdata/market summary/asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
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ditioning was cranked up. So in November, the government decided to re-
verse course. It froze the price to residential and small-volume consumers at
4.3 cents, which is where it had been before the market opened. Not only
that, but it refunded every penny that people had paid over 4.3 cents since the
market opened.28
The impact of the hot weather was exacerbated by the fact that, as I say,
the generation situation had deteriorated. The delays in bringing back the
nuclear stations and the failure of a number of expected new investments in
generation to materialize, caused capacity to be lower than it had been ex-
pected, and suddenly Ontario was in a situation where we had a serious ca-
pacity challenge.29
As we moved into the winter of 2002-2003, the political heat died down
because customers were protected through the fixed price, but then we
moved into 2003, and with the continued failure of the nuclear stations to
return, the government appointed a panel to investigate it, chaired by Jake
Epp, a former Federal Minister, and that commission continued its investiga-
tions.30 The station finally opened in late 2003,31 but then in the summer after
the blackout, the government successfully defended itself on the election that
was called, and a new liberal government was elected.32
Now, the conservatives had appointed an Electricity Conservation and
Supply Task Force in early 2003, to do a thorough investigation of Ontario's
crisis and to come up with recommendations of how they could move for-
ward. That Commission was still sitting when the election happened and
when the new government came in.33 The new government kept that Com-
mission in power. It allowed it to continue and finish its work. It changed the
chair, but essentially, it was the same group of people, and that group came
up with its final report in the first months of the new government. 34 And it is
28 Government of Ontario, Legislated Price Freeze on Electricity,
http://www.oeb.gov.on.ca/html/en/consumerinformation/electricityfreeze.htm (last updated
Ma' 7, 2002).
J.M. Hopwood, A. Alizadeh, K.R. Hedges, P. Tighe, The Nuclear Option in Canada:
Why it is Gaining Ground, World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium 2004,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2004/hopwood.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
3 Report of the Pickering "A" Review Panel, supra note 11.
"' Id. at 1.
32 Elections Ontario, By-election 2004, available at
htp://www.electionsontario.on.ca/results/2004ByElections/index HE.jsp?flag=E&layout=G.
3 Ministry of Energy, Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force Report,
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cfmn?fuseaction=electricity.taskforce (last visited Nov. 11,
2005).
34 Conservation and Supply Task Force , Tough Choices, Addressing Ontario's Power
Needs: Final Report of the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force, Jan. 2004,
www.energy.gov.on.ca/english/pdf/electricity/TaskForceReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2005) (hereinafter Addressing Ontario's Power Needs].
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on that report that the current government's policy, the liberal government
led by Premier McGuinty - it is on the basis of that report that the Liberal
Government has come up with their current proposals for reform of the sys-
tem. They have developed what is described as a "hybrid model. 35
It reminds me of the story of a famous radio show a number of years ago
in Canada, a national radio show. The host organized a competition in which
listeners were asked to come up with a slogan that embodied the essence of
Canadianness, you know, "As efficient as a German," "As romantic as an
Italian," "As passionate as a Spaniard," "As blank, blank, blank as a Cana-
dian." The winning entry was from Saskatchewan, and it was, "As Canadian
as possible under the circumstances. 36
(Laughter.)
And I think that's a reasonable description of what this policy is. It com-
bines both elements of the market and regulation, and it draws, as I say, on
the Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force. The Task Force identi-
fied a looming shortfall of generation capacity. Our nuclear stations are ag-
ing, and all of them will reach the end of their lives by 2020, beginning
around 2012. 37
The government has also promised, as part of its election platform, to
eliminate coal in the generation of electricity. 38 That's 7500 megawatts in
addition to the 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power, and we also have a grow-
ing system, a growing population. We will need another 6500 megawatts by
2020. So we are looking at about 25,000 megawatts of new or replaced ca-
pacity needed in Ontario by 2020, and that's in a system of 30,000 mega-
watts.39
The report's authors concluded that the market approach of the 1990s, of
the previous government, needed substantial enhancement to meet the chal-
lenge,40 and I think that was something of an understatement. They proposed
35 New Vision for Electricity Sector Will Mean New Supply, Increased Conservation, Sta-
ble Prices "Balanced Approach " Includes New Ontario Power Authority to Ensure Supply
and New Rate Plan to Serve Consumers, CANADA NEWSWIRE ENGLISH, Apr. 15, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/April2004/15/c 514.html; see also gener-
ally Press Release, Ministry of Energy, Government of Ontario, Electricity Conservation and
Supply Task Force Report Confirms Need for New Direction in Ontario's Electricity Sector
(Jan. 14, 2004),
http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/GPOE/2004/01/14/c9897.html?lmatch=&lang=e.html.
36 Jonah Goldberg, Bomb Canada: The Case for War, NATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. LIV, No.
22, Nov. 25, 2002.
37 Addressing Ontario's Power Needs, supra note 34.
38 Mondo Politico, Canada Federal Election 2004: Voter Guide,
http://www.mondopolitico.com/elections/canada2004 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
9 Independent Electricity System Operator, Supply Overview, available at
htt~://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/media/md supply.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
0 Addressing Ontario's Power Needs, supra note 34, at 1.
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an action plan that included stable, regulated prices, which would reflect the
true cost of power for all consumers. 41 The government has done that with its
recent announcement that it is regulating part of the output of Ontario power
generation. They are going to regulate the price of our hydro and nuclear
units. They recommended peak and off-peak prices for customers to encour-
42
age conservation and peak shaving. They recommended the market should
move to increasingly being based on longer-term contracts and the develop-
ment of load-serving entities, which are large customers that buy power to
counterbalance the large entities that sell it, and they recommended the con-
tinuation of the spot market as a balancing tool.
43
So I'm getting signals here that I should wrap up, so I will conclude by
saying that our system now in Ontario is a hybrid system. It is not fully regu-
lated. It is not fully market. It is partially regulated on the price side, but at
the same time, we still have a functioning wholesale market, which is not one
that would cause market enthusiasts to leap with joy because it is heavily
dominated by one large seller, Ontario Power Generation, which has about
70% of the power." And it has very little muscle on the buying side because
of the nature of our - of the market structure. So it is an evolving system. We
have created an Ontario Power Authority, which is responsible for ensuring
we have sufficient capacity. It will issue requests for proposals. It will basi-
cally put the government's purchasing power behind the generation contracts
so that generators can get financing.45
We've already issued a number of RFPs, which will be taken over by the
Ontario Power Authority. The contracts will be taken over by them. So we
also have government involvement not only in the price regulation side, we
have significant government involvement on the purchase of generation. We
are not leaving that to the market as the previous government did. We are
inserting a government agency into that process in the hope that as the sys-
tem stabilizes, the private sector will ultimately eventually wish to generate
41 Id. at 86; See also Ministry of Energy, Ontario Government Introduces Fair And Stable
Prices For Electricity From Ontario Power Generation,
www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.c fm?fuseaction=english.news&body=yes&news-id=90 (Feb.
23, 2005).
42 id.
43 Id., at Section 5, p.21.
44 Energy Probe, Utility Reform, Regulation & Consumer Protection - Reforming On-
tario's Electrical Generation Sector,
http://www.energyprobe.org/energyprobe/index.cfin?DSP=content&ContentlD=9576 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2005).
45 Minster of Energy, Minster's Speeches: The Ontario Power Authority - What It Is and
Where It Is Going,
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cfm?fuseaction=media.speeches&speech=26012005 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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without the safety net of government contracts.46 But that's quite a bit down
the road.
So I will leave it there to give you something to chew on, and I look for-
ward to your questions.
Thank you very much.
46 Id.
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